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The Picture Begins to Assert Itself:
Rules of Construction for Essential Health Benefits
in Health Insurance Plans Subject to
the Affordable Care Act
Wendy K. Mariner *
I. INTRODUCTION
Joan Miró described his artistic method as moving from free expression
to more detailed execution: “I begin painting and as I paint, the picture
begins to assert itself. . . The first stage is free, unconscious. The second
stage is carefully calculated.”1 Like Miró, the drafters of the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”)2 might resist being labeled Surrealists, but the product
of their efforts is a large canvas on which a new picture of health insurance
is emerging. In broad strokes, the ACA lays out a vision for financing
access to comprehensive, affordable health care, thus changing the nature of
health insurance. No longer the subject of an ordinary, voluntary
commercial transaction – because almost everyone must obtain some form
of coverage – health insurance is becoming a form of social insurance.3
* Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of Public Health,
Professor of Law, School of Law, Professor of Socio-Medical Sciences, School of Medicine.
My thanks to Professors George J. Annas, Leonard H. Glantz, and Jeffrey W. Stempel, and
Michael E. Cannella, Health Law & Bioethics Fellow, BU School of Public Health, for
insightful comments and suggestions. Errors remain my own.
1. Susie Hodge, Why Your Five-Year-Old Could Not Have Done That: Modern Art
Explained 63 (2012) (quoting Miró). My thanks to Professors Stempel and Annas for
inspiring this metaphor.
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
3. See Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle Over Health
Care Reform 241 (2011) (“The Affordable Care Act restructures health insurance so as to
achieve for all Americans the aims it has been serving only for some—to provide access to
health care and protection against the risk of being bankrupted by medical costs.”); Wendy
K. Mariner, Health Insurance Is Dead; Long Live Health Insurance, 40 Am. J.L. & Med.
195, 201 (2014) [hereinafter Mariner, Long Live Health Insurance] (“[T]he ACA cemented a
broader social function for health insurance, employing it to serve the goal of access to
affordable healthcare for all.”). The ACA’s future depends on somewhat unpredictable
political support for some of its elements. See David Nather, Health Care Torch Passed . . .
to Nobody, Politico (Dec. 7, 2014, 8:29 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/healthcare-democrats-113379.html.
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While private, commercial insurance remains a critical element of this
system, it is now subject to extensive regulations intended to achieve the
ACA’s dual goals of comprehensive coverage and affordability.4 Health
insurers who sell policies in the individual and small group markets,
including through health insurance exchanges or marketplaces, must
comply with ACA requirements for issuance, renewal, coverage, and
actuarial value for a significant segment of the health insurance market.5
This shift in the nature of health insurance creates some challenges for
the law governing the interpretation of health insurance policies. Insurance
policies are typically viewed as a specific category of contract, such that
traditional rules of contract construction apply to ascertain the meaning of
an insurance policy.6 A substantial body of scholarship has refined these
rules to fit the particular quirks of insurance, especially covered benefits
and exclusions in standard form insurance policies.7 Yet, considerable
debate remains over which rules are justified and which should apply in
which circumstances.8 Many rules of construction do not seamlessly fit
health insurance policies.9 Health insurance itself has long been a bit of an

4. See Starr, supra note 3 (The ACA “seeks the more limited goal of making health care
and health insurance ‘affordable.’”). Health insurance, whether public or private, finances
most health care services in the United States. National Health Expenditures by Type of
Service and Source of Funds, Calendar Years 1960-2013, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (follow the
hyperlink labeled “National Health Expenditures by type of service and source of funds, CY
1960-2013”) (last modified Dec. 9, 2014, 6:26 AM).
5. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296,
excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) (guaranteed issuance of insurance); §
300gg-11 (no lifetime or annual limits); § 300gg-14 (extension of dependent coverage); see
also 45 C.F.R. Pt. 153 (2014) (provisions for risk adjustments, risk corridors, and
reinsurance); Pt. 156 (requirements for offering qualified health plans on exchanges); Pt. 158
(medical loss ratio requirements).
6. Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653, 65758 (2013) [hereinafter Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance]. See generally Susan
Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 107, 107-35 (2008).
7. See Robert H. Jerry, II & Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law 12564 (5th ed. 2012); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory,
And Public Policy 118-119, 175-87 (1986) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK]
(discussing reformation of contracts, breaches of contract, and measures of damages). See
generally Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 Mich. L.
Rev. 531 (1996) [hereinafter Abraham, Policy Interpretation]; James M. Fischer, Why Are
Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24
Ariz. St. L.J. 995 (1992); Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 471 (1961).
8. See Jeffrey W. Stempel et al., Principles of Insurance Law 103-38 (4th ed. 2012)
(discussing the legal system and methods by which it assesses insurance policies and
determines coverage).
9. See infra Parts IV-V.
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anomaly in the insurance field.10 The history of health insurance includes
examples of courts struggling with whether to classify health plans as
service contracts or as insurance for purposes of state insurance
regulation.11 With health insurance operating as a federally regulated
industry to finance health care, rather than offering only voluntary contracts
to accept certain risks, conventional rules of construction have diminishing
relevance. The question of how to interpret coverage governed by the ACA
becomes more acute as federal and state governments implement the new
regulatory scheme.12 The challenge is to move from the broad strokes of
the ACA canvas to more deliberate details.
This article attempts to take a first step in that direction, without – it
must be said – completing the picture. The article explores which rules of
interpretation should apply to one specific line of insurance – health
insurance policies, primarily qualified health plans, sold to individuals and
small groups through the exchanges and private markets governed by the
ACA.13 The ACA requires such plans to cover Essential Health
Benefits,14 described in Part II, but both the statute and the regulations
speak in broad categorical terms, leaving considerable discretion to insurers
to decide what to cover in particular health plans and in individual cases.
This raises the question of which rule – or rules – of construction should be
used to make coverage decisions and resolve coverage disputes.
Two possibilities are explored here. First, the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, described in Part III, holds some promise. Part IV examines
whether that doctrine is suited to making ex post decisions about what
health care is covered within the meaning of Essential Health Benefits

10. See Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got to Do With It?
Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 Am. J.L. & Med. 436,
438 (2010) [hereinafter Mariner, What’s Insurance Got to Do With It?] (describing ways in
which health insurance differs from conventional insurance).
11. See, e.g., id. at 444 (describing health insurance as including elements of both
conventional insurance and service contracts); Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n., 107 F.2d 239
(D.C. Cir. 1939). See also Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, at 24 (noting that in “the health
care arena, the line between an ordinary service contract and an insurance contract is more
elusive.”).
12. See Mariner, Long Live Health Insurance, supra note 3, at 214 (concluding, “[T]he
ACA has taken the first step in the process to provide general standards for health insurance
coverage. The next step is to reevaluate the normative standards in insurance law that govern
what insurers must do for insureds at the level of patient care.”).
13. The article does not address state Medicaid expansion programs, including those
permitted pursuant to a waiver under Social Security Act § 1115, that are allowed to
establish benchmark equivalent coverage, which is similar to Essential Health Benefits. See
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(2).
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L.
113-235, 113-287, and 113-291); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6(b) (West, WestlawNext through
P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291).
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governed by the ACA. Since Essential Health Benefits are a statutory
requirement, Part V considers the need for rules of statutory interpretation.
These could compensate for a disadvantage of the doctrine of reasonable
expectations – the likely absence of specific expectations by the parties. The
article concludes that courts, insurers, and policyholders would be well
served by adopting a functional combination of both approaches, which
might be called reasonable statutory expectations, to carry out the
regulatory and financing functions of ACA plans. As noted in Part VI, this
is a modest conclusion, given the circumscribed scope of private health
plans currently subject to ACA requirements. It adds only slightly more
definition to the picture. Nonetheless, such a functional approach to
interpreting ACA plans could play a positive role and inform a growing
number of health plans.
II. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS
The goal of the Affordable Care Act is to increase access to health care
by enabling individuals and small groups to purchase affordable health
insurance in the private market, including through web-based marketplaces
(called Exchanges in the Act).15 This goal is bolstered in part by the
individual mandate, and tax credits and subsidies to enable low-income
individuals to purchase insurance.16 To ensure the availability of
insurance, the Act requires private health insurers that offer qualified health
plans to individuals or small groups through a marketplace exchange or in
the regular private market to comply with specific requirements.17 These

15. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (“The Act aims
to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of
health care.”); see 26 C.F.R. § 1.5000A-2 (2014) (West, WestlawNext through Apr. 9, 2015;
80 Fed. Reg. 19,036) (explaining minimum essential coverage).
16. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 111-148, 111-152,
111-159, and 111-173); see also 26 C.F.R. §1.5000A-2 (West, WestlawNext through Apr. 9,
2015; 80 Fed. Reg. 19,036); 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296,
excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) (discussing premium assistance tax credits).
The majority of those who purchased coverage through an exchange are eligible for
subsidies currently, since the IRS interpreted §§ 1311 and 1321 of the ACA to permit
subsidies to those who purchased through the federal website. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2
(West, WestlawNext through Apr. 9, 2014; 80 Fed. Reg. 19,036) (detailing a taxpayer’s
eligibility for premium assistance).
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18021 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L.
113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) (defining qualified health plans); § 18022 (defining
qualified health plans); §18022 (outlining the essential health benefit requirements). The
number of grandfathered plans has been declining. Sarah Barr, FAQ: Grandfathered Health
Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/
grandfathered-plans-faq/. Consequently, most grandfathered plans will ultimately be
replaced by self-insured plans or plans that must meet ACA requirements. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 18031, 18041 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-

441

The Picture Begins to Assert Itself

2015

include guaranteed issue and prohibitions on exclusions based on preexisting conditions and health risks, prohibitions on lifetime and annual
benefit limits, as well as requirements for plan actuarial values, medical loss
ratios, risk adjustments, and data reporting.18 The exchanges may be
established or operated by a state, the federal government, or a federal-state
cooperative arrangement of various types.19 This article refers to the ACA
plans required to meet these conditions as “ACA plans,” whether they are
offered through an exchange or in the ordinary insurance market.
To assure consistency in benefit design, the ACA requires ACA plans
to cover ten categories of health services, called Essential Health Benefits
(“EHB”).20 The Act defines EHB as ten broad categories of benefits:
(1) Ambulatory patient services;
(2) Emergency services;
(3) Hospitalization;
(4) Maternity and newborn care;
(5) Mental health and substance use disorder services, including
behavioral health treatment;
(6) Prescription drugs;

287, and 113-291) (establishing the Exchanges and noting that these requirements do not
apply to large group plans or employer-sponsored self-insured or grandfathered plans).
18. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 155 (2014) (establishing the exchanges); 45 C.F.R. Pt. 156 (2014)
(listing the requirements for insurers offering qualified health plans on exchanges); 42
U.S.C.A § 300gg (prohibiting discriminatory premium rates); § 300gg-1 (requiring health
insurance issuers to accept every employer and individual that applies for coverage); §
300gg-3 (prohibiting preexisting condition exclusion); § 300gg-2 (guaranteeing that health
insurance coverage is renewable); § 300gg-5 (requiring non-discrimination in health care); §
300gg-11 (prohibiting establishment of annual/lifetime limits on the dollar value of
benefits); § 300gg-13 (requiring minimum coverage for preventive health services and
prohibiting cost sharing in various situations); § 300gg-14 (allowing dependent children to
stay on their parents health plan until 26 years of age); § 300gg-19 (requiring an effective
internal appeals process); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296,
excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) (providing a transitional reinsurance
program); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18062 (establishing a program of risk corridors); 42 U.S.C.A. §
18063 (establishing criteria and methods for low and high actuarial risk plans); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 18071 (implementing income-based cost sharing reductions). ACA plans meeting the
conditions can be approved as “qualified plans” that can be sold through the marketplace
exchanges. § 18031(c) (establishing criteria for qualified health plans).
19. State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2015, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/ (last
visited Apr. 13, 2015); Sarah J. Dash & Amy Thomas, New State-Based Marketplaces
Unlikely in 2015, but Technology Challenges Create More Shades of Gray, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (May 1, 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
publications/blog/2014/may/new-state-based-marketplaces-unlikely-in-2015; accord Abbe
R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534 (2011) (discussing variations
in exchanges and Medicaid programs as examples of evolving conceptions of federalism).
20. § 18022(b)(1).
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(7) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices;
(8) Laboratory services;
(9) Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management;
and
(10) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.21
To complicate matters, the ACA also requires that four general
“considerations” be taken into account in designing coverage of EHB. First,
the EHB categories must be balanced, without undue weight given to any
single category.22 Second, coverage must not discriminate on the basis of
age, disability, or life expectancy.23 Third, the needs of diverse groups,
including women, children, and people with disabilities, should be taken
into account.24 And finally, benefits should not be denied on the basis of
age, life expectancy, present or predicted disability, degree of medical
dependency, or quality of life.25
The ACA charged the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) with the task of defining EHB.26 The Secretary, however,
initially allowed the states to flesh out the actual benefit package for their
own markets, within some broad parameters.27 States could select a
“benchmark” plan as the template for EHB.28 Benchmark plans that did
not include all ten EHB categories needed to add the missing categories to
qualify.29 This allowed the states and the health insurance industry to use
existing policies, often with little modification, as benchmarks to meet
eligibility requirements in the rapid gear-up to the first plan year of the
ACA’s operation, beginning on or after January 1, 2014.30

21. Id. The HHS regulations repeat the same unannotated list of benefits. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 156.110 (West, WestlawNext through Apr. 9, 2015; 80 Fed. Reg. 19,036).
22. § 18022(b)(4)(A).
23. See id. at § 18022(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he Secretary shall. . .not make coverage decisions,
determine reimbursement rates, establish incentive programs, or design benefits in ways that
discriminate against individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life.”).
24. Id. at § 18022(b)(4)(C).
25. Id. at § 18022(b)(4)(D).
26. Id. at § 18022(b)(1).
27. 45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (West, WestlawNext through Apr. 19, 2015; 80 Fed. Reg.
19,036). See generally Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acad., Essential Health Benefits: Balancing
Coverage and Cost 79-102 (Cheryl Ulmer et al. eds., 2012) (providing recommendations as
to the process for defining EHB in terms of a typical small employer health insurance plan,
without specifying content).
28. Additional Information on Proposed State Essential Health Benefits Benchmark
Plans, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/
Data-Resources/ehb.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) .
29. See id. (“[W]hen designing plans that are substantially equal to the EHB-benchmark
plan, beginning in 2014, issuers may need to conform plan benefits, including coverage and
limitations, to comply with [ACA] requirements and limitations.”).
30. See id. For a summary of each state’s benchmark plan, see Consumer Information
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The ostensible purpose of specifying EHB for ACA plans was to offer
people in the individual and small group market a set of benefits that were
comparable to the more robust benefits covered by employer-sponsored
plans,31 while maintaining affordable premiums.32 However, reliance on
existing health plans as benchmarks meant that benefits would not
necessarily be uniform across the states.33 Indeed, anecdotal evidence
suggests that benefits vary somewhat within a single state, since different
insurance carriers use different definitions of what specific services count as
a benefit within the same category.34

and Insurance Oversight, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/cciio/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
31. § 18022(b)(2) (providing that EHB should be “equal to the scope of benefits
provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary” without
distinguishing between plans offered by large and small employers); see INST. OF MED. of the
Nat’l Acad., supra note 27, at 80-94 (noting that the IOM recommended using small
employer plans as a benchmark, because individuals and small groups are the market for
plans offered on an exchange and such plans had lower premiums and actuarial values than
large employer plans).
32. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH P LAN CHOICE AND PREMIUMS IN
THE 2015 HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE 1-3 (2015), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/
health/reports/2015/premiumreport/healthpremium2015.pdf (discussing affordable
premiums).
33. See JUSTINE GIOVANNELLI ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: REVISITING THE ACA’S ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS
REQUIREMENTS 1-2 (2014), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/
publications/issue-brief/2014/oct/1783_giovannelli_implementing_aca_essential_hlt_
benefits_rb.pdf (discussing how 2014 and 2015 federal regulations did not create “a single,
nationally uniform package of health services” and how states tailored “benefit standards to
reflect state priorities”); see also Aimee M. Grace et al., The ACA’s Pediatric Essential
Health Benefit has Resulted in a State-By-State Patchwork of Coverage with Exclusions, 33
HEALTH AFF. 2136, 2139-141 (2014) (examining the benchmark plans in all fifty states and
noting how they differ in relation to pediatric services).
34. See Robert Weisman, Demand for Expensive Hepatitis C Drug Strains Insurers,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/05/31/costlynew-hepatitis-treatments-curing-patients-but-straining-health-care-system-finances/
SmBE9NoUESxjfgphfqvXKL/story.html (reporting that Sovaldi, a new drug to treat
Hepatitis C, is priced incredibly high which significantly increases expenses for insurers who
cover them; as a result, one insurer in the state of Massachusetts, Neighborhood Health,
created its own criteria to qualify patients for coverage of the drug and other insurers plan to
develop a “gated” approach to pay doctors and hospitals); see also Andrew Pollack,
Lawmakers Attack Cost of New Hepatitis Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/lawmakers-attack-cost-of-new-hepatitisdrug.html?_r=0 (reporting that with regards to Sovaldi “some insurers say the system cannot
absorb the $84,000 price for a 12-week course of treatment – or $1,000 a daily pill” and that
some health plans are limiting treatment to the sickest patients). New drugs to treat the
Hepatitis C Virus, such as Olysio (simeprevir) and Sovaldi (sofosbuvir), can often cure the
chronic condition in more patients with certain genotypes in less time and with fewer side
effects than previously used drugs alone, such as Interferon, Ribavirin, and either Incivek or
Victrelis. Advances in Medications to Treat Hepatitis C, AM. LIVER FOUND.,

Vol. 24

Annals of Health Law

444

The ACA requires the Secretary of HHS to develop standards for
insurers to use in preparing a summary of benefits and coverage.35 The
current standards (or template) focus on costs to the policyholder, including
premiums, deductibles, co-insurance, co-payments, and out-of-pocket
limits.36 The template lists terms for services in generic language, like
emergency room services, urgent care, prenatal and postnatal care,
rehabilitation services, and hospice services.37 A glossary presents brief
definitions of basic terms like balance billing, deductible, and durable
medical equipment, without identifying specific services.38 For example,
the term “medically necessary” is defined as “health care services or
supplies needed to prevent, diagnose or treat an illness, injury, condition,
disease or its symptoms and that meet accepted standards of medicine.”39
Standard terminology should facilitate plan comparisons, so consumers
should find these definitions helpful.40 However, the summaries do not—
and probably cannot—describe precisely what services will be provided to

http://hepc.liverfoundation.org/treatment/the-basics-about-hepatitis-c-treatment/whatmedications-are-used-to-treat-hepatitis-c/ (last updated Apr. 2015). Another example is
variation in substance abuse treatment. The Massachusetts Association of Health Plans
(MAHP) noted that commercial health plans cover most of six FDA-approved medications
to treat opioid addiction, but not Methadone. See Letter from the Mass. Ass’n of Health
Plans to the Mass. Div. of Ins. (Sept. 26, 2014) (on file with author) (discussing treatment for
opioid addiction). See also MASS. ASS’N. OF HEALTH P LANS, OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT:
EVIDENCE BASED MEDICINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, II ON POINT: HEALTH POLICY BRIEF 2-5
(2015), available at http://www.mahp.com/unify-files/MAHPOnPoint_March2015_
Opioid.pdf (arguing that opioid addiction treatment should include a full range of therapies,
including medication, in addition to more costly inpatient therapy, which is most often
recommended).
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-15 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 113235, 113-287, and 113-291) (“[T]he Secretary shall develop standards for use by a group
health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance
coverage, in compiling and providing to applicants, enrollees, and policyholders or
certificate holders a summary of benefits and coverage explanation that accurately describes
the benefits and coverage under the applicable plan or coverage” and the explanation is to
include a description of the coverage for each of the EHB categories, as well as exceptions,
reductions, and limits on coverage).
36. Summary of Benefits and Coverage Template, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.
1-2, available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-Reports-and-OtherResources/Downloads/sbc-template-accessible.pdf.
37. Id. at 2-3.
38. Glossary of Health Coverage and Medical Terms, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs. 1-2, available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Downloads/Uniform-Glossary-12-19-14-FINAL.pdf.
39. Id. at 3.
40. See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of
Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 394, 423-24 (2014)
(suggesting that the ACA requirements could be a model for property/casualty and other
lines of insurance to enable consumers to compare policy terms in a standardized format).

445

The Picture Begins to Assert Itself

2015

anyone in need of future medical care. In any event, the templates are not
intended to prescribe the particular services that an ACA plan must cover,
and should not be interpreted as doing so. It is the insurer that chooses the
services it will cover within EHB categories to comply with ACA
requirements.
The variation in EHB will not necessarily be smoothed over in
subsequent plan years, for at least four reasons. First, there are so many
different insurers, each with multiple plans, that it is unrealistic to expect
that they would all define coverage in exactly the same way. Second, it is
impossible to specify everything that is or should be covered. This is why
health plans have traditionally listed categories of services, such as inpatient
hospital services or mental health services, rather than particular drugs,
diagnostic tests, surgical procedures, or similar treatments.41 The services
are too numerous to catalog in an insurance policy. A comprehensive list
could run thousands of pages. Moreover, as scientific and medical
knowledge advances, new services should be added, and perhaps currents
ones dropped.42 Third, insurers are free to use their own formulas to
calculate the actuarial value of their plans.43 This may encourage valuing
costs or adding or omitting particular services within each EHB category to
achieve the minimum actuarial value required for ACA plans.
Finally, at the level of patient care, it is impossible to predict precisely
what care should be covered (apart from routine preventive services and
highly standardized therapies, such as setting a broken leg) until an

41. See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 34. Participants in employee group
health plans are entitled to receive a summary plan description (although not the actual group
health plan, which can be quite lengthy, unless requested) with descriptions similar to the
HHS summary described. See Employee Income Security Retirement Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
1022, 1024. Employee benefit plans and summaries also generally describe benefits in
categories, rather than particular services; and while details are sometimes provided for
controversial conditions like infertility or items like durable medical equipment, services for
general medical conditions, such as heart disease or rheumatoid arthritis, are rarely
mentioned. Copies on file with author. See generally, Wendy K. Mariner, Business vs.
Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed Care, 23 J. L. Med. & Ethics 236, 241
(1995); Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of Insurance to
Accommodate Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 Am. J. L & Med. 187 (1994); Mark
A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Models of Rationing: Health Insurers’ Assessment of
Medical Necessity, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637 (1992).
42. See Alan M. Garber, Evidence-Based Coverage Policy, 20 Health Aff. 62, 79-80
(2001) (providing that in practice, health insurers often rely on guidelines generated
internally or based on medical specialty recommendations for best practices to determine
what services are appropriate for particular medical conditions).
43. See 45 C.F.R. §156.135 (requiring HHS to provide an actuarial value (AV)
calculator for insurers to calculate the actuarial value of their plans, but also allowing the use
of alternative AV calculators subject to HHS requirements and state-specific standard
populations subject to HHS approval).
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individual actually needs care. What care is appropriate often depends on
the medical condition and circumstances of the individual who seeks care.
For example, even if liver transplantation is expressly listed as a covered
service, it would be inappropriate for policyholders with medical
contraindications to receive such a transplant. This means that what counts
a covered benefit often cannot be specified ex ante in the policy when it is
issued, but must be decided ex post if and when a person seeks care.
The ex post nature of benefit coverage determinations suggests that
policyholders typically will not know what services an ACA plan will cover
unless there is consistency in interpreting EHB when people need health
care. When disputes arise over coverage, consistency may be achieved only
through the application of remedial principles, those that govern the
interpretation of coverage.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
The breadth and generality of EHB categories, enhanced by the
“considerations” with which they should be balanced and fleshed out, offer
a nearly blank canvas for benefit determinations. Still, it may be possible to
add a little paint to the canvas by considering just how EHB coverage
should be interpreted.
The generality of EHB categories suggests that the doctrine of
reasonable expectations may hold some promise as a rule of construction.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations occupies a somewhat unsettled
place in disputes over insurance coverage.44 Despite an impressive
pedigree and acceptance by most insurance law scholars,45 it has not been

44. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 961, 969-977 (1970) [hereinafter Keeton, Part One] (introducing the
reasonable expectations principle); see also Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions: Part Two, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1285 (1970) [hereinafter Keeton, Part Two]
(arguing that the reasonable expectations principle could fruitfully apply to the interpretation
of warranties in insurance policies).
45. See Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 729, 729-732 (2000) (stating that a
reasonable expectations analysis would help to assist “academic scholars, jurists, and
insurance law practitioners alike” if the theory is interpreted properly); see also Robert H.
Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 Conn. Ins.
L.J. 21, 22-23 (1998) (discussing the history of the doctrine of reasonable expectations);
Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 107, 111, 150 (1998)
[hereinafter Rahdert, Revisited] (describing four ways that the concept of reasonable
expectations is used and rejecting criticisms of each use); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet
Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the
Misleading Mythology of the Judicial Role, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 181, 206-10 (1998) [hereinafter
Stempel, Unmet Expectations] (discussing scholarly reactions to the reasonable expectations
theory and noting that scholars support the doctrine more than do courts); Stephen J. Ware, A
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defined or applied entirely consistently.46 Critics, including insurers,
practitioners and some judges, have resisted its appeal.47 In contrast to
more formal rules of contract construction, the doctrine calls for enforcing
the policyholder’s objectively reasonable expectations even if the policy
provisions negate such coverage.48 Some, though not all, of this
divergence in opinion may stem from the assumption that the doctrine’s
viability depends upon its relevance and application to all insurance
disputes, or at least those in all lines of consumer insurance.49
Professor (later Judge) Keeton formulated the principle of honoring

Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1461, 1461 (1989)
(stating that “[academic] commentary almost uniformly supports the reasonable expectations
doctrine”); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 323,
323-324 (1986) [hereinafter Rahdert, Reconsidered] (providing that the reasonable
expectations doctrine was initially very popular with more than one hundred insurance cases
in the court system referencing the doctrine, comprising nearly half of the states); Kenneth S.
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable
Expectations of the Insured, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1151, 1152-153 (1981) [hereinafter Abraham,
Judge-Made Law] (discussing the history and application of the reasonable expectations
principle).
46. Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law
After Two Decades, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 823, 824 (1990); see Randy Maniloff & Jeffrey
Stempel, The Reasonable Expectations Approach to Insurance Policy Interpretation, in
General Liability Insurance: Key Issues in Every State (3rd ed. forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript on file with author) (describing court decisions in all states that accepted and
rejected the reasonable expectations doctrine or one of its variants); see also Abraham,
Judge-Made Law, supra note 45, at 1153 (stating that the reasonable expectations principle
is “not a monolithic one”, as it has been applied in a variety of circumstances, including
“cases where the insured’s expectation of coverage was probably real and
reasonable. . .where an expectation of coverage was less probable, but the policy’s denial of
coverage seemed unfair. . .where an expectation of coverage was improbable and the denial
of coverage would not appear unfair.”); Jeffrey E. Thomas, Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 1-5 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE AND LAW PRACTICE §5.05[3] (2015) [hereinafter
Thomas, Appleman on Insurance] (analyzing four approaches to the reasonable expectations
doctrine); see also infra Part IV discussion.
47. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 295, 300-301 (1998) [hereinafter Thomas, An
Interdisciplinary Critique] (arguing that the doctrine is internally inconsistent); see also
Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable Expectations after Thirty Years: A
Failed Doctrine, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 425, 426, 432 (1998) (arguing that the doctrine lacked
clear standards, was inconsistently applied, and raised insurance costs); Ware, A Critique of
the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, supra note 45 at 1461-1462 (arguing that the doctrine
should be abandoned, because the inequality of bargaining power and standard form
contracts the doctrine purports to remedy can promote economic efficiency).
48. Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 45, at 183.
49. See James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is Indispensable, If
We Only Knew What For?, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 151, 152 (1998) [hereinafter Fischer,
Reasonable Expectations] (discussing the value of the doctrine of reasonable expectations as
a “methodology used to import ‘fairness’ into the loss distribution system” of insurance in
general).
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reasonable expectations to account for judicial decisions that favored an
insurance policyholder despite policy language that appeared to exclude or
limit coverage – decisions that could not be explained by existing
interpretive rules.50 Policing doctrines, such as fraud, misrepresentation,
concealment, duress, mistake, impracticability, and supervening frustration,
did not apply in such decisions.51 Likewise, the decisions did not involve
issues of warranty or estoppel.52 Professor Keeton’s goal was to offer a
principle that could impose order on decisions that might otherwise seem
arbitrary.53
Professor Keeton stated his reasonable expectations principle as
follows: “The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have
negated those expectations.”54 Keeton’s initial justification for the
judiciary’s use of such a principle was the disadvantage placed on
policyholders who must buy a standard form contract.55 Then, as now,
“[i]nsurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion.”56
In such

50. Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 961-62.
51. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts §§ 4.1 – 4.20 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing policing
doctrines).
52. As used in practice, however, the reasonable expectations doctrine sometimes
resembles principles of unconscionability and estoppel. Thomas, Appleman on Insurance,
supra note 46; Jerry, supra note 45, at 36; see Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, at 127–28
(stating that “[t]he essential function of this facet of the reasonable expectations idea is to
secure the basic fairness of policy terms and procedures).
53. See Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 961 (arguing that is possible to find some
“currents of principle” in the decisions).
54. Id. at 967. The reasonable expectations principle was Keeton’s second principle. Id.
at 961-62. Keeton’s first principle of unconscionable advantage has rarely been
controversial, manifesting, as it does, a more general rule against enforcing unconscionable
provisions in contracts in general: “An insurer will not be permitted an unconscionable
advantage in an insurance transaction even though the policyholder or other person whose
interests are affected has manifested fully informed consent.” Id. at 963; see Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) (stating that a court may refuse to enforce a contract or a
certain term that is found to be “unconscionable”). A third principle of detrimental reliance
is uncontroversial and is of little relevance to the issues considered here. It provides: “A
policyholder or other person intended to receive benefits under an insurance policy is
entitled to redress against the insurer to the extent of detriment he suffers because he or
another person justifiably relied upon an agent’s representation incidental to his employment
for the insurer.” Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 977–78.
55. Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 966–67. For a seminal discussion of standard
form contracts, see generally W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The
Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21 (1984).
56. Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 966; accord Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1176–77 (1983) (defining a
contract of adhesion); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631–32 (1943) (using insurance contracts as
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circumstances, Keeton argued, it is appropriate for courts to interpret or
“regulate” insurance contract language “as laymen would understand it and
not according to the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters.”57
Although considered revolutionary in some respects, the doctrine could
also be considered a fair adaptation of conventional rules of contract
interpretation to insurance disputes.58 As Professor Jerry notes, the
essence of a contract is a meeting of the minds, so that “the reasonable
expectations of the parties are fundamental to the formation of a contractual
obligation.”59
Where coverage disputes concerning standard form
language in consumer policies arise, it makes some sense to consider the
consumer’s reasonable expectations of coverage.
The reasonable expectations doctrine gained notice during the
1970s.60 It became generally accepted, if sparsely and inconsistently
applied in practice, in the 1980s.61 Since then, the doctrine has suffered
retrenchment, with some courts limiting its application to cases in which
policy language was ambiguous and other courts rejecting it entirely.62
Scholars and courts have subjected the doctrine to criticism,63

key examples of contracts of adhesion).
57. Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 967; accord Kessler, supra note 56, at 637 (“In
dealing with standardized contracts courts have to determine what the weaker contracting
party could legitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser’s ‘calling,’
and to what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based on the
typical life situation.”). There exists understandable hesitation to apply the reasonable
expectations doctrine to policies that have been carefully negotiated by so-called
“sophisticated policyholders” who, unlike ordinary consumers, may have sufficient
knowledge or bargaining power to negotiate a carefully tailored policy rather than accept a
standard form policy. See Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257,
1261 (5th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that the principle of construing ambiguous policy
provisions against the drafter might not apply where the policy was negotiated by a
“sophisticated” commercial company and the insurer who drafted the resulting policy). See
generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Stempel on Insurance Contracts § 4.11 (2009) (describing the
sophisticated policyholder concept and its application ); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the
“Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 Drake L. Rev.
807 (1993) (noting that courts have begun to recognize that some parties are more
sophisticated than others).
58. See Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, at 142–45; see also Roger C. Henderson, The
Formulation of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and the Influence of Forces Outside
Insurance Law, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 69, 74 (1998) (noting that the doctrine was influenced by
the § 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which addressed situations in which
standard form contract terms can be ignored).
59. Jerry, supra note 45, at 29.
60. See Abraham, Judge-Made Law, supra note 45, at 1153; see also Stempel, Unmet
Expectations, supra note 45, at 184; Jerry, supra note 45, at 22.
61. See Maniloff & Stempel, supra note 46 (forthcoming) (listing state by state rules).
62. Id. See generally Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 7 (explaining how public
policy relates to interpretation of insurance contracts).
63. See, e.g., Fischer, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 49, at 172 (arguing that the
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reevaluation,64 and reconciliation.65 As a result, Keeton’s original
principle has spawned several variations.66 Most prominent are a strong
(pure) form and a weak form. The strong form follows Keeton’s original
formulation, allowing the policyholder’s reasonable expectations to control,
even though the policy’s text precludes coverage.67
The weak version
differs little from the general principle of contra proferentem, which
construes ambiguous contract language against the drafter.68 Indeed, it is
questionable whether this weak version should be considered a variation on

doctrine fails to offer meaningful criteria for determining reasonable expectations); Thomas,
An Interdisciplinary Critique, supra note 47 (arguing that the doctrine fails to achieve its
goals); Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 47 (arguing that the doctrine is plagued with
problems like indefiniteness and unpredictability); Ware, supra note 45 (arguing for
abandonment of the doctrine).
64. See, e.g., Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45 (defending the doctrine against
critiques); Rahdert, Reconsidered, supra note 45 (updating his views of the importance of
the reasonable expectations doctrine); Abraham, Judge-Made Law, supra note 45 (analyzing
applications of variations of the reasonable expectations doctrine).
65. See, e.g., Swisher, supra note 45 (discussing how the doctrine of reasonable
expectations is a “‘middle ground’ synthesis of traditional, objective, and contractually based
reasonable expectations principles”).
66. See Jerry & Richmond, supra note7, at 145-151 (describing the doctrine of
reasonable expectations and its variations); see also Stempel, supra 45, at 192–93
(describing seven court reactions: (1) strong or pure Keeton version; (2) construction in
favor of insured where contrary text is hidden, surprising or contravenes the essence of the
contract; (3) mandated coverage to accomplish the purpose of the policy; (4) estoppel against
insurer because of insurer’s actions; (5) construction of ambiguous text in favor of insured’s
expectations; (6) rejection of policyholder’s expectations; and (7) rejection of policyholder’s
unreasonable expectations or expectations that contravene basic insurance principles, such as
moral hazard, adverse selection or fortuity); Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, at 115, 126,
136, 140 (finding four applications of the doctrine in cases of (1) ambiguous policy
language, (2) unconscionable policy provisions, (3) making the policy work for its intended
purpose, and (4) protecting policyholders from catastrophic loss).
67. See Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, at 146 (describing the strong form of the
reasonable expectations principle); see also Stempel, supra note 45, at 192 (explaining that
this strong form the most favorable to policyholders).
68. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981) (explaining that standard
contract terms are construed against the drafter); see also Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45,
at 112 (explaining that the “ambiguity principle” invokes contra proferentem – a maxim that
the courts apply to interpret ambiguous insurance policy language). This weaker form and
variations that apply only in the presence of ambiguous language fit within traditional rules
of contract interpretation. Id. Professor Jerry describes how noted scholars of contract
foreshadowed the reasonable expectations doctrine. See Jerry, supra note 45, at 42-50.
Among the antecedents Jerry cites are Kessler, supra note 56, Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of
Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 Am. Econ. Rev. 665 (1925), SPENCER L. KIMBALL,
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A STUDY IN THE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY, BASED ON WISCONSIN RECORDS 1835-1959 (1960), and Alan
Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in The Jurisprudential
Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (Jody S. Krauss & Stephen D. Walt, eds.,
1999).
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the doctrine at all.69
The scholarly debate produced limited consensus on how best to define
and apply the doctrine.70 The twenty-first century has seen only a
smattering of scholarly contributions that even relate to the idea of
reasonable expectations.71 One possible reason for the continuing unease
may be that scholars have not found consensus on a principle that can apply
to all lines of insurance without disrupting the predictability of the meaning
of contract terms. Universality, while desirable, is not a necessary quality
for a principle of interpretation or construction. Some principles may fit
only certain types of contracts. It is at least worth examining whether the
doctrine does fit one particular context – health insurance policies that must
cover the EHB required by the ACA.
IV. DOES THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS SUIT
EX-POST INTERPRETATIONS OF ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS?
Commercial health insurance policies occupy a somewhat unusual
space among lines of insurance.72 They cross the boundary between
conventional insurance and service contracts, because they cover both
fortuitous losses, like accidental injuries and heart attacks, and predictable
“losses,” such as preventive services.73 The ACA has pushed health
insurance even farther away from the conventional insurance model and
toward becoming a method of financing health care.74 Conventional rules
of contract construction may be inadequate to interpret the terms of these
new ACA health plans in light of the ACA’s requirement for coverage of

69. See Randall, supra note 6, at 109-110 (arguing that some courts apply contra
proferentem, while characterizing it as a reasonable expectations approach).
70. See Fischer, supra note 49, at 153 (noting the doctrine’s “profound influence both in
our conception of what insurance law is and how insurance law is implemented in the
courts,” despite its adoption by only a minority of states).
71. See, e.g., Arthur J. Park, What to Reasonably Expect in the Coming Years from the
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured Doctrine, 49 Willamette L. Rev. 165 (2012); W.
David Slawson, Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to Prevent Deceptive Contracting
by Standard Form, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 853; David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra
Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. Colo. L. Rev. 431 (2009); Dudi Schwartz,
Interpretation and Disclosure in Insurance Contracts, 21 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 105
(2008); Randall, supra note 6; Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer
Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 Wash.
L. Rev. 227 (2007); Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 139 (2005).
72. See Mariner, supra note 10, at 441-47 (discussing characteristics of health insurance
before the ACA took effect).
73. See id. at 438.
74. See Mariner, supra note 10, at 196-201 (noting that the ACA eliminated most
insurance techniques of risk selection and underwriting for health plans subject to ACA
requirements).
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EHB and its elimination of traditional methods of selecting and
underwriting risks.
ACA plans do have the characteristics of insurance policies that make
the doctrine of reasonable expectations a potentially useful rule of
construction. First, and most obviously, ACA plans are contracts of
adhesion – standard form contracts for consumer insurance – the type of
insurance contract that the doctrine of reasonable expectations fits best.75
As Keeton noted, “the insured is left little choice beyond electing among
standardized provisions offered to him, even when the standard forms are
prescribed by public officials rather than insurers.”76 The standardized
form may still offer some value to the extent that it provides uniform terms
in compliance with ACA requirements and approved by state insurance
regulators.77 However, insurers, rather than regulators, typically prepare
the plan language, so terminology is not necessarily uniform.78 Moreover,
as long as the Secretary and state regulators allow insurers to draft their
own ACA plans, variation in policy language is likely to remain.79 In
these circumstances, the ACA’s goal of ensuring a reasonably uniform
package of benefits may not be attained without a reasonably uniform
principle for interpreting EHB policy language.
Second, ACA plans may be more “adhesive” than ordinary insurance
policies, because individuals must buy a policy or face a penalty.80 Like
consumers who purchase other types of insurance, purchasers of ACA plans
have little bargaining power.81 However, this is not the typical take-it-orleave-it situation most consumers confront with standard form contracts.
While ordinary insurance purchasers may have little or no choice of an
automobile insurance policy, for example, they can refuse to buy a car (at
least in theory) and thereby avoid having to buy insurance without losing
any money. Persons obligated to obtain minimum coverage under the ACA

75. See Abraham, Policy Interpretation, supra note 7, at 540.
76. Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 966.
77. Where basic coverage terms are standard, consumers may be better able to compare
other terms that may be important to them, such as premium rates, cost sharing, and
participating providers. Standard forms have other recognized advantages, such as defining
terms uniformly, reducing the transaction costs of negotiating individual agreements with
numerous similarly situated individuals, and avoiding the need for individualized
underwriting. See Slawson, supra note 55. The ongoing development of rules for web-based
Summaries of Benefits and Coverage offers some promise here, although perhaps not
enough to clarify EHB. See supra text accompanying notes 35–40.
78. This is not unique to health insurance, of course. See Keeton, Part One, supra note
44, at 966–67.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
80. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2015).
81. See Schwarcz, supra note 40; see Daniel D. Barnhizer, supra note 71.
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do not have that option82. They must “take” a policy, because they cannot
“leave it” without penalty.
Third, those who purchase through a marketplace exchange have no one
to bargain with. They log on to the state or federal website and choose from
a list of plans.83 The information about plans on these websites is typically
limited to a list of the general categories of covered benefits (e.g.,
emergency care, hospital care, maternity benefits), premiums, cost sharing
amounts, some service limits, and perhaps a list of participating provider
networks. The website may advise applicants to seek more information
from each insurer, but insurer websites contain little more information than
the exchange, suggesting that those who buy directly from an insurer are
likely to learn no more than those who buy through an exchange
marketplace.
ACA plan purchasers have few, if any, sources of independent
information about plan coverage.84
There is some evidence that
independent insurance brokers offer limited advice about different plans,
perhaps because brokers themselves know little more than what consumers
find on websites or are not forthcoming with everything they do know.85
Insurance regulators have not traditionally provided health insurance
information directly to consumers.86
The ACA’s requirement for
standardized Summaries of Benefits is a step in the right direction, but
should not be expected to offer detailed coverage explanations.
ACA plan purchasers typically cannot read a policy before buying it.
Most policyholders never receive a copy of the policy at all, until after the
contract has been made.87 Of course, few consumers read any insurance
policy in detail, if at all, and insurers do not expect them to do so. 88
82. Persons exempt from the minimum coverage requirement or penalty include
undocumented aliens, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(3); persons with certain religious objections, id.
at § 5000(d)(2); prisoners, id. at § 5000A(d)(4), and persons below certain income
thresholds, id. at § 5000A(e).
83. See, e.g., HealthCare.gov, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
www.healthcare.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (federal); Access Health CT, www.ct.gov/
hix/site/default.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (Connecticut); Get Covered Illinois,
https://getcoveredillinois.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015 ) (Illinois); Kentucky’s Healthcare
Connection, KYNECT, https://kynect.ky.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015 ) (Kentucky).
84. See generally, Schwarcz, supra note 40 (arguing that the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau should encompass consumer protection in insurance markets).
85. See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1263, 1267, 1322, 1329-1331 (2011) (presenting findings from a study of homeowners
policies).
86. Id. at 1323–25.
87. Keeton, supra note 44, at 968; see Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque, supra note 39,
at 421; Deborah Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance Law Through
Stories, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1994).
88. See Rakoff, supra note 56, at 1179; Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding:
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Llewellyn famously called consumer consent to standard form contract
terms a fiction.89 And consumers who do read a policy are likely to find it
incomprehensible, despite recent efforts to prepare readable text.90
Important details may be hard to find, such as coverage exclusions tucked
into the definition of terms.91 Such textual vagaries give some courts
reason to interpret insurance policy provisions to favor the policyholder.
Fourth, and of special importance for ACA plans, the full policy rarely
answers the questions a consumer may want or need to know. Some
scholars have recommended more specific disclosure of plan terms to
compensate for the disadvantages consumers face in purchasing almost any
type of insurance.92 But disclosure of ACA plan terms is not enough.
There is evidence that consumers have trouble understanding or using
standard disclosures in many contexts.93 ACA plans present the more
difficult problem that the plan itself cannot fully disclose everything that
will (or will not) be covered. As noted above, the description of EHB
categories is so broad and vague that, apart from a few dental and vision
services, the policy itself cannot make explicit all covered benefits or
exclusions. Thus, it is impossible to assume that had the consumer read the
policy she would have recognized the limits of coverage. Furthermore,

The Tested Language Defense, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1075, 1077 (2010); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 211 cmt. b. (1981) (“A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of
agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the
standard terms.”).
89. Karl. N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370 (1960).
90. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 1327; see generally Tesa Wilkinson-Ryan, A
Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1745 (2014); Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1203 (2003); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the
Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 213 (1995); see also Michael I. Meyerson, The
Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 Ga. L.
Rev. 583, 595 (1990).
91. Some versions of the reasonable expectations doctrine are applied where
exclusionary language is found to be hidden, obscure, or misleadingly drafted. See Stempel,
supra note 45, at 192; John Dwight Ingram, The Insured’s Expectations Should Be Honored
Only If They Are Reasonable, 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 813, 822 (1997).
92. See Rakoff, supra note 56; Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The
Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in
Standard Form Contracts, 31 Seattle U. L. Rev. 469, 512 (2008). See also, Melissa T.
Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism – The Sliding Scale Approach to
Unconscionability, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 29–34 (2012) (describing literacy, lack of
familiarity with the subject matter, time, psychological and other barriers that make actual
consumer assent to standard form contract terms unrealistic).
93. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure 14–31, 26–32, 69 (2014) (summarizing research finding that
required disclosures are not necessarily read, understood or used by consumers to make
decisions).
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neither insurers nor regulators are likely to be able to compensate for the
consumer’s lack of information at the time the policy is purchased, because
they cannot predict ex ante an individual’s future needs.
This brings us to the fifth and most significant reason why the
reasonable expectations doctrine may suit ACA plan coverage decisions.
Covered EHB in an ACA plan are necessarily determined ex post – when
the consumer becomes a patient and seeks insurance coverage for health
care. With inevitably vague EHB coverage terminology, decisions about
what medical services the insurer will pay for necessarily arise only when
the policyholder becomes a patient and seeks health care.94 At that point,
the insurer and the patient each may have different ideas – or expectations –
of what EHB coverage includes.
These different ideas cannot be attributed to the policyholder failing to
read the policy, or even misunderstanding its text.95 The difference is
invited by the vague description of EHB coverage in the policy.
Conventional contract interpretation rules cannot resolve the difference,
because they do not address this problem. They simply do not fit. The
rationale for enforcing the terms of a standard form contract that the
policyholder merely failed to read is inapplicable here.96 The terms
themselves could not specify what should be enforced. The principle that
hidden terms should not be enforced against the policyholder is similarly
inapplicable where specific terms are not hidden, because they are not
included in the contract at all.97 The rule against enforcing unconscionable
terms is similarly inapplicable.98 Most policing doctrines are not likely to
apply to disputes over EHB coverage. Unless the insurer has led the
policyholder to believe that a specific medical service would be covered,

94. There are, of course, important exceptions to this scenario. Some exclusions, such
as custodial care or experimental therapies, may be clearly set forth in the policy, while
others might be inferred from the text. Here, the focus is on the more common circumstance
in which the determination must be made solely on the basis of what counts as part of EHB.
95. See Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems
with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 485, 515–18
(2004) (arguing that different rules may apply to ex ante purchases and ex post treatment
decisions, because “consumers choose health plans, while patients choose medical care”).
96. See generally Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002); see generally W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 529 (1971).
97. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 184–93 (describing judicial refusal to enforce
coverage exclusions hidden in unexpected places in the contract or couched in unusual
language, such that consumers would not necessarily notice them).
98. Keeton, supra note 44, at 963 (Keeton’s first principle forbids allowing insurers to
take advantage of unconscionable provisions.).
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fraud, misrepresentation, or estoppel is not likely to apply.99 The insurer is
also unlikely to have made any warranty with respect to coverage of general
EHB services.100
The rule that ambiguities in the policy should be construed against the
drafter – the insurer – might seem to have a place here.101 However, EHB
categories are not so much ambiguous as they are vague. There is a
difference between ambiguity and vagueness.102 Ambiguous terms are
subject to more than one objectively reasonable interpretation.103 Under
the general contract rule, ambiguities are construed in favor of the
policyholder’s expectations, especially where the policyholder was not in a
position to know what the insurer meant.104 Strict application of such a
rule to permit coverage of whatever a policyholder wants, however, can put
insurers at an unfair disadvantage if the policyholder’s expectation is
unreasonable.105 Moreover, such a strict application would not necessarily
serve the purpose of an ACA plan.106
The weak form of the reasonable expectations doctrine ameliorates this
drawback somewhat by limiting coverage to what would be reasonable for
policyholders to expect.107 However, even the weak form does not address

99. See generally Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies
in Litigation with a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial
Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, “MEND the Hold,”
“FRAUD on the Court” and Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 589
(1997–1998).
100. Exceptions might be found where the insurer and insured have an ongoing
relationship, such as coverage of specific services for a chronic disease. See Stempel,
Swisher, & Knutsen, supra note 8, at 129; see also Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and
Default Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 43, 54–55 (1993); see generally John Aloysius Cogan
Jr., Readability, Contracts of Recurring Use, and the Problem of Ex Post Judicial
Governance of Health Insurance Policies, 15 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 93 (2010); see
generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978).
101. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 206; see also Rahdert, Revisited, supra 45, at 116–
18; see also Abraham, Policy Interpretation, supra note 7, at 531 (“[I]nsurance policy
provisions are in a sense always ambiguous.”); see also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy
of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1712 (1997) (“No
contract can fully and unequivocally address every question that may arise regarding its
performance or nonperformance.”).
102. See Farnsworth, Contracts, supra note 51, at § 7.8 (distinguishing vagueness from
ambiguity in contracts).
103. See Stempel Swisher & Knutsen, supra note 8, at 131.
104. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981).
105. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why
Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed against the Drafter, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 171, 189–
91 (1995); but see Horton, supra note 71, at 473 (arguing that strict liability contra
proferentem “promotes uniformity of meaning in standard-form contracts”).
106. See infra Part V.
107. Most courts construe the rule to permit coverage only where coverage is an
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the core problem in ACA plans. The problem is not that the insurer uses
ambiguous terms, or even that the policyholder interprets those terms
differently. Rather, the insurer cannot wholly describe the coverage and the
policyholder cannot form concrete expectations. The problem is the vague
nature of coverage.
Vague terms present a more difficult problem than do ambiguous terms.
Professor Farnsworth defined vague language as terms that are imprecise in
marginal applications.108 However, EHB categories are vague in almost
all their applications, not only in marginal ones. Indeed, EHB categories are
so general as to be nearly meaningless.109 They offer only generic
boundaries with little hint as to their specific content.110 Consider the
EHB categories of ambulatory patient services, hospitalization, maternity
and newborn care, and rehabilitative and habilitative services and
devices.111 A policyholder can only learn exactly what illnesses, injuries,
and therapies an insurer includes in these categories at the time – or shortly

objectively reasonable expectation, considered in light of permissible extrinsic evidence.
Stempel, Swisher & Knutsen, supra note 8, at 131; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206
(1981); Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, at 116–17 (discussing the ambiguity rule in the
context of insurance).
108. See E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘Meaning’ in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939,
952–55 (1967) (identifying three types of imprecise contract language: vague terms;
ambiguous terms; and ambiguous syntax); see also Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, at 126–
67.
109. See Stempel, supra note 45, at 264 (“Many insurance policy provisions, even those
routinely enforced by courts, simply are not clear unless one understands the nature of the
insurance product and the background of the specific contract.”).
110. See id. Four EHB categories have been somewhat more fully defined. Most
specific are Federal regulations requiring coverage of preventive services recommended by
the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. See Recommendations for Primary Care Practice,
U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE (Oct. 2014), http://
www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/recommendations. Some contraceptive
services listed met with considerable controversy. See Exemption and Accommodations in
Connection with Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013);
see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). Mental health
and substance use services are less well articulated in regulations. Many insurers have
specified pharmaceutical formularies or tiers and pediatric oral and vision services. See
generally state health insurance exchange websites: Regulations, CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT
EXCH., http://hbex.coveredca.com/regulations/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015); Summary of
Benefits and Coverage (SBC), KY. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCH.,
http://healthbenefitexchange.ky.gov/Pages/Summary-of-Benefits-and-Coverage-(SBC).aspx
(last visited Apr. 15, 2015); Rules & Regulations, MASS. HEALTH CONNECTOR,
https://www.mahealthconnector.org/about/policy-center/rules-regulations (last visited Apr.
15, 2015).
111. Essential Health Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-health-benefits/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2015).
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before – that service is sought.112 At that point, of course, the policyholder
and insurer may have quite different expectations about what should be
covered113.
To be sure, many insurers include provisions stating that they will cover
only medically accepted therapies that are recommended by a recognized
medical specialty organization or Medicare guidelines, which gives a
modicum of substance to the categories.114 However, the therapies
themselves are not listed.115 More generally, insurers typically limit
coverage to “medically necessary” or “appropriate” services and items. 116
While these terms add some limits to the general categories, the services
that will be covered remain unspecified. Typically, the insurer reserves the
contractual right to determine what is medically necessary in any individual
case.117 Thus, coverage remains unpredictable ex ante by the policyholder
and often also by the insurer.
It would be the rare policyholder who is familiar enough with health
insurance practices to be able to anticipate the range of healthcare services
that will be covered. The ordinary consumer would have to possess a strong
imagination to dream up the “losses” for which she seeks coverage ex ante.
For the vast majority, no expectation of specific coverage arises until a
physician or other health professional recommends a particular course of
therapy. In today’s health plans, insurers “satisfy” claims by paying the
provider, not the policyholder. The policyholder gets the services the
insurer decides are covered ex post.

112. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Patients’ Rights after Health Care Reform: Who
Decides What Is Medically Necessary?, 84 Am. J. Pub. Health 1515 (1994). Some services
may seem obvious, such as hospitalization for a stroke, but whether to give the patient tissue
plasminogen activator (tPA), for example, depends upon the patient’s circumstances. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Alan M. Garber, Cost-Effectiveness and Evidence Evaluation as Criteria for
Coverage Policy, 23 Health Aff. 284, 285 (2004); Harriette B. Fox & Margaret A.
McManus, A National Study of Commercial Health Insurance and Medicaid Definitions of
Medical Necessity: What Do They Mean for Children?, 1 Ambulatory Pediatrics 16 (2001);
Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically Necessary?,
340 New Eng. J. Med. 229, 230 (1999); Mariner, supra note 112, at 1516–17.
117. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 116, at 229–30. Similarly, health plans often
require prior authorization of coverage for particular services for the purpose of determining
whether particular services are medically necessary for an individual patient. For example,
while a plan may indeed cover the category of behavioral health services, specific services,
such as inpatient therapy, may not be covered and paid for without a plan determination that
it is actually medically necessary. And ongoing utilization management practices may
require periodic determinations that continued therapy is medically necessary. MAHP Letter
to Massachusetts Division of Insurance re Special Session on Treatment for Opioid
Addiction (Sept. 26, 2014) (on file with author).
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Parties to ACA plans cannot realistically agree fully on EHB coverage
ex ante, because of the unpredictability of any policyholder’s future medical
needs and the impossibility of individualized negotiation of terms. In these
circumstances, disputes over an ACA plan’s EHB coverage seem all but
inevitable. The reasonable expectations doctrine seems well-suited to the
task of interpretation, especially in its original strong form. This is because
the strong form requires the policyholder’s expectations to be “objectively
reasonable.”118 Insistence on an objective view of reasonableness makes
sense where, at the time of purchase, the policyholder did not or could not
anticipate what the plan might cover. In that case, when the policyholder
needs care, she may “expect” coverage of the course of therapy that she and
her physician now think best, regardless of cost.119
The doctrine’s focus on expectations, however, may give us pause. If it
is nearly impossible to form concrete expectations ex ante, how can one use
the concept of reasonable expectations to determine coverage ex post?120
A possible answer lies in focusing less on “expectations” and more on what
is “reasonable.”121 The reasonable expectations doctrine, applied to
disputes over coverage, could be understood to ask what an insurance
policy of this particular sort should reasonably cover.122 But, one might
object, isn’t this the same kind of question that arises with ordinary (nonACA) health insurance plans? After all, such plans typically describe
coverage in generic categories, much like the EHB categories, and present
problems of determining what that category includes.
The difference between ACA plans and their predecessor commercial
health insurance policies lies in the ACA’s requirements for coverage of all
the EHB categories, which takes much of the discretion to select services

118. See Keeton, supra note 44, at 967;
In our view, the reasonable-expectations doctrine does not automatically mandate
either pro-insurer or pro-insured results. It does place a burden on insurance
companies to communicate coverage and exclusions of policies accurately and
clearly. It does require that expectations of coverage by the insured be reasonable
under the circumstances. Neither of those requirements seems overly
burdensome. Properly used, the doctrine will result in coverage in some cases and
in no coverage in others.
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985).
119. See Ingram, supra note 91, at 826–32.
120. See Thomas, supra note 47, at 324–25 (noting that court conclusions about
policyholder expectations are often a fiction); see also Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, at
136.
121. See Fischer, supra note 49, at 163 (arguing that reasonableness may be used where
the contract is silent “as to the level and degree of required specificity”).
122. See id. at 164–65 (arguing that courts claiming to honor the policyholder’s
expectations are actually interpreting the contract to serve its social policy purpose).
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and impose limits out of the insurer’s hands.123 Moreover, the insurer is
not free to select risks for ACA plans, but must ensure balanced coverage
under the “considerations,” all while keeping premiums affordable.124
Thus, what might be reasonable for a pre-ACA health insurance policy may
not be reasonable for an ACA plan.
The ACA alters the expectations of both insurer and insured. In the
context of ACA plans, the doctrine could ask what therapy or service an
ACA plan should reasonably be expected to cover in light of the ACA’s
goal of ensuring that ACA plans cover a comprehensive set of benefits –
EHB – for a premium that is affordable to the population required to obtain
coverage.
V. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF ACA PLANS AND RULES OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The ACA creates legislative expectations for ACA plans. These can be
easily inferred from the statutory requirements for ACA plan coverage
(including EHB), guaranteed issue and renewal, no dollar caps on coverage,
nondiscrimination on the basis of health factors, actuarial values, medical
loss ratios, risk adjustments, and reinsurance, to name only a few.125 ACA
plans are almost entirely creatures of the federal statute.126 This suggests
that a fair interpretation of ACA plan terms necessarily depends on
understanding – and interpreting – the statutory provisions governing ACA
plans.
Rules of statutory interpretation are likely to be necessary in
considering how EHB coverage should be construed.127 Professor Stempel
compares the function of standard form insurance policies to that of
legislation, arguing that canons of statutory construction could prove useful

123.
124.

Mariner, supra note 10, at 439–40.
NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ADVERSE SELECTION ISSUES AND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2–4 (2011), available at
http://www.naic.org/store/free/ASE-OP.pdf.
125. See supra notes 17–18.
126. Id.
127. For general treatments of statutory analysis, see Frank B. Cross, The Theory and
Practice of Statutory Interpretation (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (4th ed. 2007 & Supp.
2010); Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory
Construction (2007); Peter L. Strauss, Legislation: Understanding and Using Statutes (2006);
William D. Popkin, Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation
(1999); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 965 (2013) (finding that legislative staff viewed legislative history as
second only to statutory text as the most important tool for interpreting legislation).
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in interpreting policy content.128 Professor Randall argues that state
“statutory and regulatory control of insurance relationships should displace
judicial reliance on contract principles.”129 ACA plans are not merely
analogous to statutes; their design and marketing are almost entirely
governed by legislation and implementing regulations. Federal law
dominates the regulatory framework for ACA plans, despite preservation of
many state insurance licensure and rate-setting functions.130 Indeed, the
scope of federal requirements make ACA plans look rather like part of a
more traditional federal benefit program, such as Medicare Part B,
administered by third party insurers.131
To properly construe the purpose, function, and terms of an ACA plan,
it may be impossible to avoid interpreting the statute itself. As Professor
Randall suggests, this shifts the starting point for interpretation from
contract to statutory rules of construction.132 If, as argued above, specific
benefits covered by EHB cannot be discerned from the plan text and the
parties have no ex ante specific intent respecting particular benefits
coverage, then contract-based rules of construction offer little guidance.
While the doctrine of reasonable expectations suggests searching for what
would be reasonable for a health plan of this type, it begs the question of
what counts as reasonable in such a plan. If one adds – or begins with – the
presumption that ACA plans are intended to function as means of financing
affordable health care, then courts may be able to resolve disputes by
focusing on the purpose that ACA plans are to serve.133
The ACA can be seen as a remedial statute – one enacted to remedy the
market failures that made health insurance unaffordable or unavailable to
more than eighteen percent of the population in 2010.134 ACA remedial
128. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 McGeorge L. Rev.
203, 215 (2010) [hereinafter Stempel Insurance Policy].
129. Randall, supra note 6, at 107; see also James Davey, Fracturing and Bundling
Risks: The Coverage Expectations of the “Real” Reasonable Policyholder, 11 Rutgers J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 118, 135–38 (2013) (discussing an English case in which the court aligned
contract interpretation with statutory interpretation).
130. See Randall, supra note 6, at 126–36. (for a summary of the variation in often
limited regulatory authority of state insurance departments even before the ACA).
131. See BARBARA S. KLEES ET AL., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID 11–13
(Nov. 1, 2014) (for a description of Medicare Part B, which combines federal payments with
beneficiary premium payments).
132. See Randall, supra note 6, at 108, 135–36. This suggests a question beyond the
scope of this article: whether ACA plans should be considered to be contracts of adhesion to
the extent that the statute and regulations serve to represent the interests of the consumer.
133. See Stempel, supra note 128, at 230 (“Particular applications of the policy to
unanticipated future disputes may not have been foreseen, but the general goals of the policy
provisions are ascertainable with reasonable certainty.”); Robert Katzmann, Judging Statutes
31–34 (2014).
134. See generally Inst. of Med., America’s Uninsured Crisis: Consequences for Health
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provisions eliminate most of the prerogatives heretofore enjoyed by
individual and small group health insurance carriers under state statutes and
common law.135 The maxim that remedial statutes should be liberally
construed seems particularly relevant here.136 This rule argues against
relying solely on contract rules of construction, particularly those that are
limited to the text of an insurance policy’s coverage provisions, and in favor
of interpreting ACA plan coverage in light of legislative intent or goals.
Arguably, then, the ACA’s requirement for EHB coverage should be
liberally construed. At the same time, the ACA goal of affordability argues
against a construction so liberal that it would jeopardize the solvency of the
health insurance industry.
Some might argue that the ACA could be considered a statute in
derogation of the common law. Such statutes were traditionally construed
narrowly,137 but that rule may hold little sway today.138 ACA provisions
governing insurance do not expressly abrogate common law rules for
interpreting insurance policies. Yet, the ACA does impose federal rules on
activities – designing, pricing, and selling health insurance policies – that
were already regulated in part at both the state and federal level.139 The
more persuasive view of the ACA is a remedial statute that expands federal
regulation to remedy the market failures remaining under pre-existing laws.

and Health Care (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/
Report%20Files/2009/Americas-Uninsured-Crisis-Consequences-for-Health-and-HealthCare/Americas%20Uninsured%20Crisis%202009%20Report%20Brief.pdf; see PAUL
FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 7 (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2011_No362_
Uninsured1.pdf (for data on the numbers of uninsured in 2010).
135. Mariner, supra note 10, at 439–40.
136. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 Geo.
L.J. 341, 402, (2010) (concluding that nineteen states have codified this rule as a method of
interpreting their state statutes).
137. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 386
(1908).
138. See Scott, supra note 136, at 402 (finding that twenty states rejected the rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed); see also Pound,
supra note 137, at 387 (arguing that the principle that statutes in derogation of the common
law should be strictly construed was already an anachronism in 1908, because “no statute of
any consequence dealing with any relation of private law can be anything but in derogation
of the common law”).
139. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 (West,
WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.); Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113235, 113-287, and 113-291); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L.
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
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Assuming that the ACA is a remedial statute, however, does not
automatically answer the question of how EHB should be construed. What
exactly should be construed expansively? One might argue that EHB
categories should be construed expansively to permit coverage of most, if
not all, services that fall within the category. But that would have the same
disadvantages that construing coverage to favor the policyholder’s
expectations would have, especially if expectations are not limited to
objectively reasonable expectations.
Here, the canons of statutory construction may help. The text of the
EHB section of the ACA is too vague to offer a plain meaning for designing
coverage or making individual patient care determinations.140 Although
the EHB requirements are not precisely ambiguous in the sense used in
interpreting insurance policies, they should qualify as ambiguous for
purposes of statutory interpretation and therefore be subject to the more
contextual rules of construction, legislative intent in particular.141
The meaning of EHB appears to depend importantly on its context – the
overall goal and function of the ACA.142 Recall that the ACA’s goal is
twofold: to expand access to care by enabling individuals to obtain health
insurance coverage, and to keep premiums affordable.143 One cannot read
the statute itself or the limited legislative history without recognizing both
objectives. Thus, the ACA itself incorporates the tension inherent in many
insurance relationships between the policyholder’s desire for coverage and
the insurer’s desire (or need) to limit expenditures. But the ACA does not
lean to one or the other. By making both objectives clear, the ACA

140. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001) (to find the meaning of a statute,
the court begins with its language).
141. See Katzmann, supra note 133, at 35; Kent Greenawalt, Statutory and Common
Law Interpretation 140 (2013) (there is “no neat categorization” or hierarchy of factors that
apply to statutory interpretation of ambiguous terms). They may also be subject to
interpretation by the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury, the
federal agencies charged with issuing regulations to implement the ACA. See Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–844 (1984).
142. See Bond v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014) (“Part of a fair reading of statutory
text is recognizing that ‘Congress legislates against the backdrop’ of certain unexpressed
presumptions,” citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)); Nat’l Ass’n
of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (words may become
meaningful only when read in context); Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000) (“A court must . . . interpret the statute as a
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious
whole.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 9 (1994)
(discussing dynamic statutory interpretation, which accepts that meaning often only becomes
clear when applied to “concrete circumstances”).
143. MORGAN DOWNEY & CHRISTOPHER D. STILL, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S
IMPACT ON PERSONS WITH OBESITY 2 (2013), available at http://
www.downeyobesityreport.com/wp-content/uploads/The-Affordable-Care-Act2.pdf.
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recognizes – indeed, requires – balancing the scope of coverage with its
cost. This suggests that within EHB categories, insurers must cover
necessary and medically acceptable services (and providers), but need not
include expensive services where safe and effective alternatives are less
costly.
One might be concerned that courts today could be reluctant to engage
in this type of functional analysis.144 Both the reasonable expectations
doctrine and the statutory intent canon fall on the functional side of rules of
interpretation.145 That is, each interprets the meaning of policy and
statutory language, respectively, in light of its function and purpose, rather
than relying on the text alone (unless the text is ambiguous or unclear).146
But reliance on text alone is not likely to resolve disputes over the meaning
of EHB coverage, at least in most cases. Thus, a rule based on function or
purpose seems inevitable. The idea that ACA plans serve a remedial
statutory function only reinforces this conclusion.
Resistance to the rule of function comes most often from scholars and
courts that prefer the formal approach to contract interpretation credited to
Professor Williston.147 This approach resists consideration of any extrinsic
evidence outside the “four corners” of the contract unless the text is
unclear.148 The text is presumed to state the parties’ intention, so that the
“plain meaning” of the text must be enforced.149 Courts in the majority of
jurisdictions view themselves as bound by their role as interpreters to avoid
making judgments that could be considered rewriting the contract between
the parties.150 Judges who are uncomfortable trying to interpret a contract

144. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts (2012) (arguing for a textualist interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 531, 532–33 (2013) (describing
conceptions of textualism); Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 178–235 (2013)
(arguing that there is no principled hierarchy of canons of construction).
145. See Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the
Formal for the Function, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 1037, 1052–53 (1991).
146. Fischer, supra note 49, at 180 (The doctrine of reasonable expectations “needs to
shed its disguise of policyholder expectations and sustain itself on its true grounding of
insurance as a public good and the corollary that coverage decisions should be based on
public policy.”).
147. Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (1961); see Swisher, supra
note 145, at 1047 (comparing formalist and functionalist approaches to interpreting
insurance policies).
148. See Randall, supra note 6, at 110–11.
149. See Restatement (First) of Contracts (1932) (presenting the formal rule of
construction); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) (1981) (reflecting a somewhat
more functional approach) (“Where the other party [insurer] has reason to believe that the
party [policyholder] manifesting such assent [to a standard form contract] would not do so if
he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”).
150. See Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 45, at 252–53; see also John E.
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without hanging their hat on a contract term may fall back on limiting their
analysis to the text of the contract.151 The rule also supports predictability
in judicial decisions; if the contract’s text is clear, it will be enforced
without resort to other evidence.152 Such predictability can save an insurer
both administrative and litigation expenses and thereby reduce premium
increases.153
However, the formal rule does not work for EHB disputes. To the
extent that enforcing clear policy language is intended to encourage the
parties to expressly agree on their specific intended bargain, the parties to
ACA plans simply cannot comply. They do not bargain together, and they
cannot adequately specify what they expect from coverage in advance.
There is not always a plain meaning. Acceptance of formal interpretation
rules only exacerbates the disadvantages of standard form contracts while
offering few, if any, of its advantages. While formal policy interpretation
may lessen the burden of judges and insurers, it is not a credible method of
identifying the intent of the parties in ACA plans.154 As Professor Fischer
argues, “If reading the policy is essentially useless, it is difficult to support
use of policy structure or language complexity as a basis for determining
reasonable expectations, or any expectations for that matter.”155
Professor Stempel argues that the judiciary has little reason to revere
the idea of judicial restraint when interpreting any type of insurance
policy.156 There is even less reason to do so in the case of ACA plans.
Most obviously, the meaning of contract terms is a matter of law for the
court to decide.157 The terms of ACA plans must also meet statutory

Murray, Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 869, 870
(2002); see also Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1119,
1120 (2008).
151. See Thomas, supra note 47.
152. See Randall, supra note 6, at 110–11. Of course, some judges may incorrectly
assume that their understanding of the meaning of a contract term is the universal
understanding. See generally Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False
Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1268 (2008) (discussing
ways in which judges find meaning in contract provisions).
153. See Rappaport, supra note 105, at 244–45.
154. Swisher, supra note 145, at 1073 (arguing that decisions sometimes draw on both
approaches, either in the same decision or in different decisions, in what he calls a “clash”
between formalism and functionalism); see Lonegrass, supra note 92, at 54–56; Michael I.
Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form
Contracts, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 1263, 1273 (1993).
155. Fischer, supra note 49, at 169.
156. See Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 45, at 292–93; Stempel, Insurance
Policy, supra note 128, at 230–31 (purpose-oriented methods of analysis are only a short
step from identifying the goals of an insurance policy).
157. See, e.g., Boatner v. Atlantic Specialty Ins. Co., 115 F. 3d 1248, 1251 (5th Cir.
1997); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. d (1981).
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requirements, and statutory interpretation is also a matter for the judiciary.
Basing decisions solely on the text of an ACA plan is to pretend to find the
meaning of words without admitting the pretense.158 Since ACA plan
provisions on EHB are likely to offer only general descriptions, courts have
little choice but to interpret their terms in light of the statutory purpose that
such plans are intended to implement. To do otherwise risks overstepping
the boundary between Congress and the judiciary.
Furthermore, ex post EHB coverage determinations are individualized
decisions, where there is less pressure for the application of a uniform rule.
The issue is whether an insurer is bound to pay for a particular course of
therapy for one individual, not a search for the plain meaning of a text
applicable to all policyholders. What may be reasonable and necessary for
one patient may not be for another, and decision-making takes place in the
context of limited resources. Courts could consider the cost to the insurer of
covering that therapy for the proportion of policyholders who are predicted
to need it and compare that cost with premiums. Surely insurers could
provide some actuarial support for the assumptions underlying the premium
rate. Insurers should be expected to pay for what the policyholder
reasonably needs and nothing more, in order to ensure the availability of
funds to cover every policyholder’s reasonable needs.159 In essence,
interpreting EHB coverage in individual cases is analogous to deciding
whether the insurer is acting in good faith, a doctrine that courts have few
qualms applying, despite its independence from the text of a contract.160
To be sure, the judicial task of dispute resolution under this analytic
framework may be complex.161 Nonetheless, it may be more honest and
acceptable to all parties than attempts to force ACA plan generalities into
ill-fitting contract rules of construction. Courts need not resort to fictions
like the intent of the parties or ambiguous text, but can focus on identifying
appropriate services within the constraints of available resources.162

158. The same could be said of judicial conclusions about a policyholder’s
expectations. See Fischer, supra note 49, at 164 (“The expectations of the policyholder are
defined by the judge’s perception of what constitutes a fair and just bargain.”).
159. See Deborah A. Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance Law
Through Stories, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 1440–45 (1994).
160. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle Without a
Name (Yet), 19 Conn. Ins. L.J. 1 (2012/2013); Robert H. Jerry, II, Bad Faith at Middle Age:
Comments on Abraham, “Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle without a Name (Yet)”,
19 Conn. Ins. L.J. 13 (2012/2013).
161. See Randall, supra note 6, at 136.
162. For examples of studies of efforts to identify cost-effective health services, see
Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Five Features Of Value-Based Insurance Design Plans Were
Associated With Higher Rates Of Medication Adherence, 33 Health Aff. 3493 (2014);
Matthew L. Maciejewski et al., Value-Based Insurance Design Program in North Carolina
Increased Medication Adherence But Was Not Cost Neutral, 33 Health Aff. 300 (2014). For
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Moreover, to the extent that insurers and consumers gain experience with
the scope and limits of ACA plan coverage and affordability, regulatory
agencies should be able to develop more detailed rules or guidance for
specific types of EHB categories, as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services have done for Medicare benefits.163
It may not matter whether one characterizes this approach as a
reasonableness standard or as statutory interpretation.164 In the case of
ACA plans, they are two sides of the same coin.165 The approach might be
called reasonable statutory expectations. The reasonable expectations of the
parties cannot diverge significantly from Congressional intent, because all
parties are bound by the statutory framework. Moreover, the ACA itself
probably inspires its own expectations among insureds and insurers. Thus,
the rule of construction should ask what services a reasonable health plan
would cover to comply with the EHB requirements in light of ACA’s goal
of comprehensive and affordable coverage.
VI. CONCLUSION
A functional approach to ACA plan interpretation could move us
farther down the path to a more “carefully calculated” picture of ACA plan
coverage. Since the ACA has altered the concept of insurance in the context
of health insurance, it stands to reason that insurance law applied to ACA
plans should adapt itself to the ends that the ACA seeks to achieve.
Traditional rules of construction for insurance policies do not easily fit the
individualized determinations of health services covered as part of EHB.

an analysis of health insurers responses to ACA requirements, see Michael J. McCue &
Mark Hall, Health Insurers’ Financial Performance and Quality Improvement Expenditures
in the Affordable Care Act’s Second Year, 72 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 113 (2015) (to meet
ACA requirements, insurers increased medical loss ratios, decreased median administrative
expenses and most increased quality of care expenditures in 2012). Although still too early
to predict, some uses of accountable care organizations may encourage more value for
money. See, e.g., Arnold M. Epstein, et al., Analysis of Early Accountable Care
Organizations Defines Patient, Structural, Cost, and Quality-Of-Care Characteristics, 33
Health Aff. 95 (2014).
163. Although Medicare uses private carriers to administer claims, which can result in
some variation in coverage determinations, it also issues National Coverage Determinations
to be applied nationally. See Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Ctrs for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., Medicare Coverage – General Information, CMS.GOV,
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/CoverageGenInfo/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
State insurance regulators may also have discretion to make EHB content more concrete,
depending on their state statutory authority. See Stempel, Insurance Policy, supra note 128,
at 246.
164. See Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable
Expectations, 32 Val. U. L. Rev. 19 (1997).
165. See Fischer, supra note 49, at 163–64 (noting that reasonableness standards import
public policy into private law).
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Without explicit, individualized content in the definition of EHB, the
language of the plan itself can offer no text, ambiguous or otherwise, on
which courts might pin their decisions. In the absence of specific ex ante
expectations about particular health services for a particular person,
coverage determinations cannot rely on the intent of the parties or their
expectations.
Yet the purpose of ACA plans is clear. They should provide reasonably
necessary care at an affordable price. This two-part goal offers a framework
for a functional analysis of EHB – reasonable statutory expectations.
Decision-makers, both insurers and courts, would be well served by
beginning an analysis of EHB coverage that is consistent with the ACA’s
two-part goal. In so doing, decision-makers can apply well-established rules
of statutory construction, which necessarily apply to health plans that are
created and governed by federal law. Where such rules do not resolve
conflicting interpretations, decision-makers can look to what can be
reasonably expected of a comprehensive, but affordable, ACA plan.
This is a modest conclusion, one that does not pretend to solve all
controversies over ACA plans, much less other insurance policy
interpretations. It addresses only the interpretation of EHB in ACA plans
marketed to individuals and small groups. Thus, it does not challenge the
coverage exclusions permitted by the ACA, for example.166 Neither does
it address plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
nor any public benefit programs such as Medicare or Medicaid. Moreover,
it may not affect ACA plans that include mandatory arbitration provisions,
although arbitrators could – and, I would argue, should – apply the same
principles in their proceedings.167 It could be used in both internal and
external review processes for claims determinations.
The proportion of the population currently enrolled in ACA plans is
small—less than five percent of eligible individuals.168 Nevertheless, the
symbolic value of ACA plans far exceeds the number of people they enroll.
And, barring a collapse of federal tax credits, that number may grow over

166. See, e.g., Natali L. Regoli, Insurance Roulette: The Experimental Treatment
Exclusion & Desperate Patients, 22 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 697 (2004).
167. See Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse
Preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 Conn. Ins. L.J. 253 (2004/2005); Richard C.
Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 279 (Winter/Spring 2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness,
Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution
Through Adjudication, 3 Nev. L. J. 305 (2002/2003).
168. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKETPLACE: SUMMARY ENROLLMENT REPORT FOR THE INITIAL ANNUAL OPEN
ENROLLMENT PERIOD 1 (2014), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/
2014/marketplaceenrollment/apr2014/ib_2014apr_enrollment.pdf.
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time.169 ACA plans are an essential piece of the picture of health benefits
for all Americans.
A functional approach to interpreting ACA plans may move us toward
a more realistic view of health insurance in general. It may also move
insurance law toward a more principled conception of highly regulated
insurance policies.170 At the very least, a rule of construction based on the
legislative purpose of ACA plans is a step toward achieving fairness both
across populations and in individual cases. Decisions that are consistent
with ACA goals may foster trust among consumers and patients that their
health insurance is serving their most basic needs, even if it does not pay for
all their hearts’ desires. This is, after all, the end that the ACA seeks to
achieve.171

169. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 190 L. Ed. 2d 355
(2014) (challenging the authority of the Internal Revenue Service to issue tax credits to
individuals who purchase health insurance through the federal exchange or a federal-state
partnership exchange); see supra note 15.
170. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 670 (describing the ACA as the strongest example
of treating health insurance as a heavily regulated industry heavily akin to a public utility).
171. Susie Hodge, Why Your Five-Year-Old Could Not Have Done That: Modern Art
Explained 63 (2012) (quoting Miró). My thanks to Professors Stempel and Annas for
inspiring this metaphor.

